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STRICTLY WRONG AS A TAX POLICY: THE
STRICT LIABILITY PENALTY STANDARD IN
NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTIONS
Mik Shin-Li*
This Note analyzes the propriety of using a strict liability standard to
assess tax penalties for transactions lacking economic substance.
Noneconomic substance transactions lack legitimate business objectives
and exist only to produce tax benefits. Under current law, the Internal
Revenue Service can disallow the tax benefit claimed by the taxpayer and
then assess a penalty for the taxpayer's understatement of tax liability. In
response, the taxpayer can assert a reasonable cause exception, which can
serve as a defense to the penalty should the taxpayer demonstrate that he
had reasonable basis for his tax position. In the last decade, numerous
legislative proposals sought to eliminate the reasonable cause exception
and replace it with a strict liability standard. This Note examines the
conflict created by this potential change in the tax law.
This Note begins by defining the economic substance doctrine, as used in
the U.S. courts of appeals, to determine whether a transaction lacks
economic substance. This Note then explains the accuracy-related penalty
assessed for noneconomic substance transactions, as well as the reasonable
cause exception to the penalty. Two cases illustrate the interaction of the
economic substance analysis, the tax penalty, and the reasonable cause
exception. Next, this Note summarizes legislative proposals spanning from
1999 to 2009, which would codify the economic substance doctrine and
adopt a strict liability penalty standard. The strict liability standard is then
analyzed at length, as this Note discusses the arguments for and against it.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that on balance, the strict liability standard
should not be adopted, but regardless of whether the current penalty regime
is retained or alternative solutions are developed, the reasonable cause
exception should remain a feature of the standard by which to penalize
noneconomic substance transactions.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Matthew McKenna for his assistance. This
Note is dedicated to my parents, my sister Seung, and my husband Zhi for inspiring me to
strive at every endeavor, covering me always with abounding love, and trusting me with
utmost confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
In Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States,' two law
partners, Cary Patterson and Harold Nix, each made thirty million dollars
between 1998 and 2000 by representing the State of Texas in its litigation
against the tobacco industry.2 To manage their sixty million dollars of
wealth, Patterson and Nix sought investment vehicles through their long-
time accounting firm, which in turn identified Presidio Advisory Services,
an investment advisory firm involved in foreign currency trading.3 Presidio
designed a complex plan by which Patterson and Nix could create large
artificial losses, which could then be used as tax deductions to offset their
taxable income.4 As a result of this transaction, the details of which will be
discussed in Part I.B.3.a, Patterson and Nix each claimed over twenty-five
million dollars in artificial tax deductions. 5
1. 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007), affd in part, vacated in part, 568 F.3d 537
(5th Cir. 2009).
2. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 540.
3. Id. at 541.
4. See id. at 541-42.
5. Id. at 542.
2010] 2011
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Tax shelters are defined by the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code)
as any "entity, plan, or arrangement" that has the "significant purpose" of
avoiding or evading federal income tax. 6 These transactions are not entered
for a money-making business purpose, but solely as a means to reduce
federal tax liability.7 These tax shelters can be described as abusive in the
sense that they depart from genuine economic objectives and fundamental
tax principles to exploit a loophole in the tax law.8
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) invalidated the tax deductions
claimed by Patterson and Nix, concluding that the transaction giving rise to
the tax deductions lacked real economic substance and was entered for the
sole purpose of avoiding taxes. 9 As a result, Patterson and Nix owed higher
taxes.10 Furthermore, the IRS assessed accuracy-related penalties for their
substantial understatement of tax liability, at twenty percent of the claimed
tax deduction amount, based on Internal Revenue Code section 6662.11
Patterson and Nix argued before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas that, inter alia, the accuracy-related tax penalties should
not apply because they had reasonable cause for their tax treatment. 12
The court's analysis of the accuracy-related penalties assessed against
Patterson and Nix is detailed in Part I.B.3.a. For now, consider whether
Patterson and Nix should be given the opportunity to assert a reasonable
cause exception to the penalties in light of the following facts: (1) Patterson
and Nix entered the transaction with genuine intent to invest in a seven-year
foreign currency portfolio; 13 (2) Patterson and Nix did not know that
Presidio Advisory Services designed the transaction to effect an early
withdrawal before the end of the seven-year investment period; 14 and (3)
Patterson and Nix were unaware of the tax benefit that would result from
their withdrawal until after such withdrawal.' 5  In light of these
circumstances, should Patterson and Nix have been subjected, not only to a
disallowance of the tax deduction claimed, but also to a penalty amounting
to approximately ten million dollars collectively? 16
6. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2006).
7. See Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV.
47, 52-53 (2001).
8. See id. at 56, 69.
9. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 542.
10. Id.
11. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 898-99
(E.D. Tex. 2007).
12. Id. at 902-04.
13. Id. at 896.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 893.
16. The ten million dollar penalty amount is a rough estimation, calculated using fifty
million dollars in tax deductions claimed by Patterson and Nix and the accuracy-related
penalty rate of twenty percent of the claimed tax deduction amount. See supra notes 5, 11
and accompanying text.
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This Note analyzes the conflict embodied in a legislative proposal
considered under the 111th Congress that sought, among other things, to
eliminate the reasonable cause exception to accuracy-related penalties
assessed against transactions lacking economic substance (noneconomic
substance transactions). The bill, America's Affordable Health Choices Act
of 2009,17 or H.R. 3200, proposed to eliminate the reasonable cause
exception, thereby making the penalty standard one of strict liability.
18
This Note evaluates the pros and cons of changing the penalty standard
from reasonable cause to strict liability. This debate is important not only
in the context of bills such as H.R. 3200, but as an outstanding issue about
the proper standard by which to penalize tax shelters. Congress has
considered legislative proposals regarding noneconomic substance
transactions since 1999 when tax shelters began to attract public attention,
and in every subsequent Congress thereafter, giving rise to the inference
that the debate over the proper penalty standard will likely continue even if
a particular bill under the current Congress does not pass into law.1 9 Hence,
this Note is anchored in the framework of H.R. 3200 but should be read in
the larger context of policy concerns surrounding the proper standard by
which to penalize noneconomic substance transactions. 20 Along the same
17. H.R. 3200, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
18. See id. §§ 452-53; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3200, THE "AMERICA'S AFFORDABLE HEALTH CHOICES
ACT OF 2009" 36, 49 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION ON
H.R. 3200], available at http://www.cprights.org/maryofRevenueProvisionsofHouseTri-
ComBillH.R.32007.14.09.pdf.
19. See infra Part I.C.1.
20. This Note's treatment of H.R. 3200 relies in part on the analysis of the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) on the President's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal, which is
intended to contain provisions on the codification of the economic substance doctrine (ESD)
and the penalty standard that are substantively identical to those in H.R. 3200. As the JCT
acknowledges in its analysis, the President's proposal does not anchor itself to a particular
bill in Congress; therefore the analysis proceeds with the assumption that it will encompass
another bill that Congress eventually passes. H.R. 3200 was noted as one of the most recent
bills proposing codification of the ESD. Thus, this Note uses the framework of H.R. 3200
on the premise that the underlying issues are likely to remain unchanged even if another bill
with substantively identical provisions supersedes the version of H.R. 3200 discussed in this
Note. Where the JCT borrows certain assumptions from similar 2007 proposals, this Note
uses H.R. 3200 to the extent that the underlying analysis remains valid. See STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL PART Two: BUSINESS TAX
PROVISIONS 40 n.104, 48 n.132, 69 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION], available at http://www.novoco.com/hottopics/resource files/jcs-3-09.pdf. As
of October 2009, H.R. 3200 has been superseded by H.R. 3962, which contains identical
provisions regarding codification of the ESD and the penalty standard. See Press Release,
Comms. on Ways & Means, Energy & Commerce, and Educ. & Labor, Topline Changes
from Introduced Bill to Blended Bill (Oct. 29, 2009), available at
http://bishop.house.gov/usermedia/HCR%20Topline%20Changes.pdf (summarizing the
changes between H.R. 3200 and H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act);
Posting of Betsy Miller Kittredge to EdLabor Journal, America's Affordable Health Choices
Act, http://edlabor.house.gov/blog/2009/07/americas-affordable-health-choices-act.shtml
(July 14, 2009, 15:00 EST); Govtrack.us, H.R. 3962: Affordable Health Care for America
Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-3962 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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lines, some of the arguments for or against the proposed penalty standard
originated with legislative proposals preceding H.R. 3200, but are
incorporated into the current debate to the extent that such arguments relate
to provisions that are substantively identical under the current proposal and
remain relevant to the considerations at issue today.
Part I of this Note defines the Economic Substance Doctrine (ESD) under
common law, explains accuracy-related penalties that are assessed under the
Code for noneconomic substance transactions, and traces legislative
proposals to codify the ESD both in the past and at present. Part II
discusses the conflict between the reasonable cause exception and the strict
liability standard by examining arguments for and against the strict liability
standard. Part III posits that on balance, the arguments weigh against
adopting the strict liability standard, and regardless of whether the current
penalty regime is retained or alternative solutions are developed, the
reasonable cause exception should remain a feature of the standard by
which to penalize noneconomic substance transactions.
I. THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE AND TAx PENALTIES: THE
EXISTING JUDICIAL APPLICATION VERSUS THE PROPOSED
STATUTORY STANDARD
Part I provides the background information necessary to understand the
conflict over the proper tax penalty standard to use in noneconomic
substance transactions. Part L.A defines the ESD by its judicial application
in the circuit courts. Part I.B explains the accuracy-related tax penalties
assessed for noneconomic substance transactions and the reasonable cause
exception to that penalty. Part I.C summarizes legislative efforts to codify
the ESD under the I.R.C., including the proposal to penalize noneconomic
substance transactions using the strict liability standard.
A. Economic Substance Doctrine Under Common Law
Part L.A introduces the ESD in its present state. Part I.A. I defines this
common-law doctrine and its role in the tax shelter problem. Part I.A.2
recounts the various forms of the doctrine as used across the circuit courts
and previews the implications of this circuit split on efforts to codify the
doctrine.
1. The Tax Shelter Problem and the Role of the Economic Substance
Doctrine
The I.R.C. is the body of law that establishes statutory tax rules to
compute one's tax liability.21 Where the taxpayer attempts to avoid taxes
by engaging in transactions that comply with the literal requirements of the
Code but have the effect of circumventing tax liability he would otherwise
21. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 34. See generally I.R.C.
(2006).
2014 [Vol. 78
STRICTLY WRONG AS A TAX POLICY
bear, courts can disallow the tax benefit claimed by the taxpayer. 22 This
principle is termed "substance-over-form" for the idea that courts will look
to the "transaction's substance rather than its form" in determining whether
true economic substance exists to justify the tax deduction. 23  Stated
differently, the legislative purpose behind the I.R.C. prohibits taxpayers
from reaping tax benefits by entering into transactions lacking economic
reality. 24
Tax shelter transactions differ from real economic transactions in
essence.25 Real economic transactions have the purpose of making a profit
by increasing revenues or decreasing operating expenses and, hence, must
generate a level of economic return that exceeds the cost of capital at risk of
loss. 2 6 In contrast, tax shelter transactions have the sole and specific
purpose of reducing the taxpayer's tax liability by generating losses or tax
credits and, hence, are not necessarily expected to make a positive return on
the cost and fees invested into the transaction. 27 The transactions are
designed, however, to limit any losses to small predictable losses and avoid
large unpredictable losses.28 Essentially, tax shelters are not real business
transactions but artificial transactions designed to exploit a loophole in the
tax law. 29  According to a conservative estimate in 1999, tax shelter
transactions cost the federal government approximately seven billion
dollars in federal taxes.30 Another estimate in 2003 places tax shelter costs
at eighty-five billion dollars. 31
22. See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The
economic substance doctrine represents a judicial effort to enforce the statutory purpose of
the tax code. From its inception, the economic substance doctrine has been used to prevent
taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions
that are fictitious or lack economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit.").
23. See Freytag v Comm'r, 904 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that economic
substance is required to claim a tax deduction, which is consistent with the I.R.C.'s premise
that taxation is based on a "transaction's substance rather than its form"); Donald L. Korb,
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., The Economic Substance Doctrine in the Current
Tax Shelter Environment, Remarks at the 2005 University of Southern California Tax
Institute 6 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
economicsubstance-( l_25_05).pdf.
24. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 2009);
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 34.
25. See Canellos, supra note 7, at 52-55.
26. See id. at 52-53.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 53.
29. See id. at 56.
30. See Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
106th Cong. 39-40 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters], available at
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/106h/66992.pdf (statement of Lindy Paull, Chief of
Staff, J. Comm. on Taxation).
31. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
Lieberman Says Tax Shelters Must Have Economic Substance To Deter Industry Built
Around Tax Evasion (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecordid=09d68 1 fd-74b4-4ea8-
9357-4e6708765540&Regionid=&Issueid=baeab989-7f6a-4e7a-83b9-fl 8fa0a065c9
2010] 2015
FORDHAMLAW REVIEW
Donald Korb, the former IRS Chief Counsel, has remarked that abusive
tax shelters have been one of IRS's biggest problems in the last decade.32
Similarly, the Obama Administration recently issued a press release
recognizing the tax shelter problem, noting that eighty-three percent of the
largest U.S. corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens, 33 or low-tax
countries to which the corporation can transfer its revenue to avoid taxes.34
Other commentators echo that the tax shelter problem is proliferating. 35
A judicial doctrine for dealing with tax shelter transactions is the ESD,36
which analyzes whether a transaction has real economic substance beyond
tax avoidance. 37 Gregory v. Helvering38 is one of the first cases to apply
the ESD and generally credited to be the case from which the doctrine
developed.39  In Gregory, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
taxpayers have a right to decrease or avoid taxes through legal means,
which is distinguishable from engaging in transactions solely for tax
benefits.40 The Supreme Court disregarded intermediate transfers of stocks
as transactions that had "no business or corporate purpose" and performed
no function other than reducing taxes.4 1 Similarly, in Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States,42 the Supreme Court once again distinguished between
transactions entered for the sole purpose of tax avoidance and transactions
(referencing an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimate of the impact of tax shelter
transactions).
32. See Korb, supra note 23, at 1.
33. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Leveling the Playing
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May
4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press_office/LEVELING-THE-
PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-
FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS.
34. See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX HAVENS:
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40623_- 20090709.pdf (explaining tax havens and suggesting
approaches to combat them). In the context of international tax avoidance, another
increasing problem is transfer pricing, which involves allocating a company's profits and
deductions to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions to reduce taxes. Transfer pricing is
regulated under I.R.C. section 482. See I.R.C. § 482 (2006).
35. See Canellos, supra note 7, at 49 & n.3 (citing a number of studies by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and other commentators all
noting the increase of tax shelters).
36. ESD is one of several judicial doctrines used to invalidate tax shelter transactions.
Other doctrines include sham transaction, substance-over-form, and step transaction, which
are similar to the ESD and often used interchangeably. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5 (2000).
37. See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ACM
P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 246-47 (3d Cir. 1998).
38. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
39. See Yoram Keinan, The Many Faces of the Economic Substance's Two-Prong Test:
Time for Reconciliation?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 371, 371 & n.2 (2005) [hereinafter Keinan,
Many Faces]; Yoram Keinan, It Is Time for the Supreme Court To Voice Its Opinion on
Economic Substance, TAXES, Dec. 2006, at 27, 28 [hereinafter Keinan, It Is Time].
40. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
41. See id.
42. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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entered for nontax purposes that produced accompanying tax benefits, the
latter of which should be honored.43
The ESD involves two prongs that are used to determine whether a given
transaction has economic substance: The first prong is objective-whether
the transaction resulted in a meaningful change in the economic position of
the taxpayer other than tax reduction (the economic benefit prong). 44 The
second prong is subjective-whether the taxpayer's subjective intent in
entering the transaction was merely tax reduction or some other nontax
business purpose such as profit (business purpose prong).45 The taxpayer
who claims the tax deduction carries the burden of proving that the
transaction has economic substance. 46  If a court determines that a
transaction lacks economic substance, it may recharacterize the transaction
to conform to the economic reality and invalidate the tax benefit
purportedly arising from the transaction. 47
2. Circuit Courts' Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine
This section discusses how the two-prong test is applied by the circuit
courts. There is a split among the circuits as to whether this two-prong test
should be used conjunctively or disjunctively, as well as to how each of the
two prongs should be defined.48 While this Note does not focus on the
conflict of this split in authority, it is essential to understand the circuit split
as context for the inception and development of the proposals to codify the
ESD. Specifically, the circuit courts' inconsistent application of the ESD
has been a prominent ground for attack by proponents of codification, who
argue that the ESD should be codified into the I.R.C. to clarify the doctrine
as one test for economic substance. 49
a. Circuit Split in the Two-Prong Test
Case law demonstrates a lack of uniformity in the application of the two-
prong test in the circuit courts.50 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits apply the two prongs in a conjunctive
test, requiring both objective economic benefit and subjective business
43. See id. at 583-84.
44. See Korb, supra note 23, at 10.
45. See id. at 9.
46. See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006); STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 36-37 (noting that this burden of proof still applies
to current law).
47. See, e.g., Neb. Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 133-37 (1994)
(recharacterizing purported sale and repurchase of municipal bonds as a lending transaction).
48. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
49. See infra Part I.C. 1.
50. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009);
Keinan, Many Faces, supra note 39, at 372-73; Monte A. Jackel, Farming for Economic
Substance: Codification Fails To Bear Fruit, 119 TAX NOTES 59, 61 (2008); Keinan, It Is
Time, supra note 39, at 27-28 (discussing cases demonstrating inconsistency in the circuit
courts' application of the two-prong test); infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
2010] 2017
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
purpose to deem the transaction valid for tax purposes. 51 The U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits apply the two prongs in a
disjunctive test, meaning that the presence of either the objective prong or
the subjective prong is enough to pass judicial scrutiny.52 Yet a third
approach taken by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits considers the objective and subjective prongs simply as factors to
analyze whether the transaction creates practical economic effects other
than tax benefits. 53 In Klamath, the Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged
the existence of this circuit split.54
b. Various Factors To Analyze the Two-Prong Test
In addition to the circuit split on whether the two prongs should be used
conjunctively or disjunctively, each of the two prongs is defined by various
factors. 55 For the objective economic benefit prong, at least two measures
are used to define what constitutes a "meaningful change" in the taxpayer's
economic position: One approach used by the Federal Circuit looks for
economic benefit in fact obtained.56 Another approach used by the Second
Circuit looks for the potential for profit.57  In courts using the profit
potential approach, some courts look for profit that is more than nominal 58
51. This means that even if the taxpayer meets the subjective prong by possessing a
profit motive, the tax benefit will be disallowed if the transaction objectively lacks economic
substance. See, e.g., Klamath, 568 F.3d at 545 (requiring both the taxpayer's subjective
profit motive and objective profit potential and disregarding the transaction because it lacked
objective profit potential); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 36 n.84.
52. This means that before a transaction is deemed to lack economic substance, the court
will require that the transaction lack both the objective and subjective prongs. See, e.g., IES
Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A] transaction will be
characterized as a sham if 'it is not motivated by any economic purpose outside of tax
considerations' . . . and if it 'is without economic substance because no real potential for
profit exists' . (quoting Shriver v. Comm'r, 899 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1990)));
Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction
as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other
than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists."); see also STAFF OF
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 36 n.85.
53. See, e.g., Sacks v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Instead, the
consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to
consider .... ); James v. Comm'r, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1990); see also STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 36-37 n.86.
54. See Klamath, 568 F.3d at 544.
55. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1358-60 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(invalidating a transaction because the purported benefits of managing liabilities and
hindering third-party veil piercing claims were not in fact realized); see also STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 37 n.91.
57. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1966) (invalidating a
transaction involving an unprofitable leveraged acquisition accompanied by prepaid interest
deduction); see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 37 n.92.
58. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990) (noting that a nominal profit
potential is insignificant when compared to the deductions claimed); see also STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 38 n.93.
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while other courts permit nominal profit potential to satisfy the objective
prong of the two-prong test.59
The subjective prong is also analyzed using various considerations. 60
Former IRS Chief Counsel Korb summarized at least seven types of
evidence considered by courts when determining a taxpayer's subjective
business purpose for entering the transaction. 61 Such evidence includes the
taxpayer's capital commitment to the transaction and the nature of the
relationship between the parties to the transaction. 62 Further, there is a split
as to whether financial accounting benefit qualifies as subjective business
purpose.63 One scholar has suggested that all of these variations should be
codified as one set of factors to be considered by a court in determining
whether a transaction has economic substance. 64
An in-depth treatment of the courts' rationale for the various approaches
is beyond the scope of this Note.65  The relevant takeaway is the
understanding that the circuit courts apply the ESD inconsistently, which
has served as one of the primary arguments for codifying the ESD into the
I.R.C. 66 Ultimately, the criticism is that the variations serve as means for
the courts to invalidate transactions based on a type of "smell test,"67 which
59. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 783-86 (5th Cir.
2001) (requiring any objective profit potential); Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d
89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985) (using the objective profit potential test also); see also STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 38 n.94.
60. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
61. See Korb, supra note 23, at 9-10 ("[T]he following evidence has been considered by
the courts: (i) whether a profit was even possible; (ii) whether the taxpayer had a nontax
business reason to engage in the transaction; (iii) whether the taxpayer, or its advisors,
considered or investigated the transaction, including market risk; (iv) whether the taxpayer
really committed capital to the transaction; (v) whether the entities involved in the
transaction were entities separate and apart from the taxpayer and engaging in legitimate
business before and after the transaction; (vi) whether all the purported steps were engaged
in at arms-length with the parties doing what the parties intended to do; and (vii) whether the
transaction was marketed as a tax shelter in which the purported tax benefit significantly
exceeded the taxpayer's actual investment.").
62. See id.
63. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 38 nn.95-96. Compare Am.
Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 791-92 (S.D. Ohio 2001), affd, 326
F.3d. 737 (6th Cir. 2003) (financial accounting benefits do not qualify as subjective business
purpose), with Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1978), and Newman
v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1990) (financial accounting benefits do qualify as
subjective business purpose).
64. See Jefferson VanderWolk, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine: If We
Can't Stop It, Let's Improve It, 55 TAX NOTES INT'L 547, 552 (2009).
65. For a full treatment of the various tests used in the circuit courts, see generally Jeff
Rector, Note, A Review of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 173
(2004); Keinan, It Is Time, supra note 39.
66. See infra Part I.C. 1.
67. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J.,
dissenting) ("I can't help but suspect that the majority's conclusion to the contrary is, in its
essence, something akin to a 'smell test.' If the scheme in question smells bad, the intent to
avoid taxes defines the result as we do not want the taxpayer to 'put one over.' . . . The fact
that ACM may have 'put one over' in crafting these transactions ought not to influence our
inquiry."); Rector, supra note 65, at 134 (suggesting that the circuit differences are not
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lends itself to subjectivity and inconsistent results. 68 Part I.C.1 further
describes the reasons behind proposals to codify the ESD. Before returning
to this issue, the next section of this Note explains that, once a court
determines that a transaction lacks economic substance, the court can
disallow the purported tax benefit and uphold IRS's assessment of
penalties. 69
B. Tax Penalties for Noneconomic Substance Transactions Under the
Internal Revenue Code
After a court holds that a transaction lacks economic substance and that
the claimed tax deduction should be disallowed, the next question is
whether IRS's assessment of penalties was proper. Part I.B illustrates how
these penalties operate. Part I.B.1 explains accuracy-related penalties, and
Part I.B.2 explains a defense to these penalties, the reasonable cause
exception. Part I.B.3 demonstrates how these pieces fit together by way of
two cases with opposite outcomes.
1. Accuracy-Related Penalties Under I.R.C. Section 6662
Under the I.R.C., various tax penalties are assessed for a taxpayer's
failure to comply with the requirements of the Code.70 One such penalty is
identified in section 6662 as "accuracy-related penalties," which are
assessed for underpayments of federal income tax.71 Accuracy-related
penalties are assessed for underpayments arising from (1) the taxpayer's
negligence, (2) a substantial understatement of the income tax, (3) a
substantial valuation misstatement, (4) a substantial overstatement of
pension liabilities, and (5) a substantial valuation understatement of estate
or gift tax.72 For any underpayment of income tax under section 6662(b),
the penalty is generally twenty percent of the underpayment amount.73
The second of the five scenarios above, the substantial understatement of
income tax, is used by IRS and courts to penalize underpayments arising
from the disallowance of tax benefits in noneconomic substance
transactions. 74 An "understatement" is defined as the difference in amount
determinative of the result but that courts are "informally deciding whether they 'like' a
transaction" and then using their version of the test to justify the result). See generally Mark
J. Silverman, Matthew D. Lerner & Gregory N. Kidder, The Economic Substance Doctrine:
Sorting Through the Federal Circuit's "We Know It When We See It" Ruling in Coltec, 58
TAX EXECUTIVE 423 (2006) (interpreting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
ESD analysis as ambiguous, expansive, and, ultimately, equivalent to a "we know it when
we see it" analysis).
68. See infra Part II.B.3.
69. See infra Part I.B.
70. See 47C C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 825 (2009).
71. I.R.C. § 6662 (2006); see 47C C.J.S., supra note 70, Internal Revenue § 825.
72. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(l)-(5).
73. Id. § 6662(a).
74. See infra Part I.B.3. There are cases in which IRS asserts that the disallowance of
tax deductions in noneconomic substance transactions leads to a valuation misstatement
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of the correct tax liability and a taxpayer's reported tax liability. 75 An
understatement is "substantial" if it is greater than ten percent or $5000 of
the reported tax liability.76 For corporations, that amount is the lesser of
either (1) the amount that is greater between ten percent of the correct tax or
$10,000 or (2) ten million dollars.77 The Treasury Regulations establish
rules for adjusting the amount of understatement in certain circumstances. 78
2. The Reasonable Cause Exception Under I.R.C. Section 6664
I.R.C. section 6664 establishes exceptions to accuracy-related penalties
imposed by section 6662. 79 Section 6664(c) serves as a defense to the
assertion of underpayment penalties arising under section 6662 if the
taxpayer can demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith (reasonable
cause or reasonable cause exception). 80
In noneconomic substance transactions, reasonable cause is demonstrated
by a facts and circumstances test, wherein the most important factor is the
extent to which the taxpayer attempted to assess the proper tax liability. 81
Where the taxpayer relies on a tax professional's opinion, such opinion
must be based on all relevant laws and facts in the particular case, which
requires full disclosure on the part of the taxpayer of all facts relevant to the
proper tax treatment and the purpose for entering the transaction. 82 Stated
another way, the taxpayer cannot reasonably rely on a tax professional's
opinion unless it is based on complete knowledge of the tax law and all
relevant facts that the taxpayer knew or should have known. 83  The
penalty in addition to the understatement penalty. Circuit courts are split on this issue. The
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits hold that valuation misstatement
does not apply in noneconomic substance transactions, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits permit valuation misstatement
penalties based on the disallowance of tax deductions as a result of noneconomic substance
transactions. This circuit split is beyond the scope of this Note. Because the penalty
standard debate is not differentiated by which of the two grounds is used to assert the
accuracy-related penalty, this Note will limit its discussion to substantial understatements of
income tax. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 60-61 & nn. 187-90.
75. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(A).
76. Id. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
77. Id. § 6662(d)(1)(B); see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 54.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (as amended in 2008). The calculation of the
understatement amount may be adjusted in two situations: when the portion of
understatement that is attributable to the treatment of an item is supported by substantial
authority or when relevant facts surrounding the tax treatment of an item are adequately
disclosed and substantiated by a reasonable basis. Id. In the case of tax shelters, the
calculation of understatement is adjusted by the portion attributable to substantial authority
and reasonable belief, which is covered in Part I.B.3. See infra note 128.
79. I.R.C. § 6664.
80. Id. § 6664(c).
81. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 54-55; infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
83. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 55.
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following section illustrates how the reasonable cause exception works in
cases involving noneconomic substance transactions. 84
3. Case Law Applying I.R.C. Sections 6662 and 6664 in Noneconomic
Substance Transactions
In this section of the Note, two cases help illustrate the function of the
accuracy-related penalty and reasonable cause exception in cases involving
noneconomic substance transactions. The first is Klamath, the Fifth Circuit
case introduced earlier in the Note, wherein the taxpayer established
reasonable cause by relying on the advice of tax accountants and tax
lawyers regarding a complex loan transaction.85 The second case is Long
Term Capital Holdings v. United States,86 a Second Circuit case in which
the taxpayer failed to establish reasonable cause because the tax lawyers'
advice was received long after the tax return was filed, the lawyers' opinion
was based on minimal legal analysis lacking relevant legal authority, and
the taxpayer lacked good faith.87
a. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States
In Klamath, two law partners Patterson and Nix each claimed
approximately twenty-five million dollars in tax deductions, which were
disallowed because the transaction was deemed to lack economic substance
by the IRS, whose decision was validated by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas and then affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.88 The
transaction at issue was designed by Presidio Advisory Services (Presidio),
which created a complex plan by which Patterson and Nix would invest in
foreign currencies over a seven-year period in three stages. 89  The
investments would be made through newly created limited liability
companies named Klamath and Kinabalu, which would be treated as
partnerships for tax purposes. 90 These partnerships each borrowed $66.7
million from National Westminster Bank (Bank), with twenty-five million
dollars of that amount being deemed a loan premium, which represented a
high interest rate of 17.97% to be paid to the bank.91 To protect the bank's
ability to collect this interest, the credit agreement between the Bank and
the partnerships included a prepayment provision, requiring that in the
event of early repayment of the loan by the partnerships, the bank would be
entitled to a prepayment amount of twenty-five million dollars, which
84. See infra Part I.B.3.
85. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546-48 (5th Cir.
2009).
86. 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
87. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
89. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 541.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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would decrease over seven years.92 However, within the first sixty days of
the seven-year investment period, Patterson and Nix withdrew from the
partnerships. 93  They received cash and Euros in liquidation. 94  They
subsequently sold the Euros, the proceeds of which were offset with over
twenty-five million dollars in tax deductions arising from Klamath and
Kinabalu activities. 95 Patterson and Nix achieved this result by treating the
twenty-five million dollar loan premium as if it was money they had
contributed into the partnership and then calculating the Euros received in
liquidation using that basis. 96 Then when they sold the Euros at a market
value much less than this amount, large artificial losses were created. 97
This transaction was held to lack economic substance for three reasons,
all tending to show that the transaction was not entered to achieve economic
profit but merely to generate large losses that can be used as tax
deductions. 98 First, the transaction was structured to cause the investors to
withdraw from the investment within sixty to seventy days rather than its
purported seven-year term.99 Second, a substantial portion of the purported
investment was never intended to occur because the credit agreement
provided that the Bank would hold all of the funds in collateral, with power
to force the investors to withdraw within sixty to seventy days.' 00 Third,
Presidio's service fees were a function of losses generated by the
investment, rather than as a function of profits generated. 101 Therefore, the
transaction lacked a reasonable expectation of generating a profit and failed
the objective economic benefit prong of the test for economic substance. 102
Even though the court held that Patterson and Nix possessed the subjective
intent to enter the transaction for a nontax purpose, this was not enough to
uphold the transaction because the Fifth Circuit uses a conjunctive test,
requiring both objective economic benefit and subjective business purpose
to validate a transaction. 103
In addition to disallowing the tax deductions for this noneconomic
substance transaction, the IRS also assessed accuracy-related penalties for
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 541-42 (containing an explanation of the itemized calculations giving rise
to the twenty-five million dollar tax deduction).
96. See id.
97. Id. at 542 n.2.
98. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 896-98 (E.D.
Tex. 2007).
99. This was done by requiring that the investors maintain collateral with the Bank in an
amount that exceeded the total value of the amount owed to the bank. The Bank had
discretion to determine whether the collateral was satisfied, or to declare a default and force
the investor to withdraw from the partnership. See id. at 896-97.
100. Id. at 897.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 897-98.
103. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009);
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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the partners' substantial understatement of tax liability.104 Patterson and
Nix argued against the penalties by asserting the reasonable cause
defense. 105  The Fifth Circuit noted that the most important factor in
establishing reasonable cause is the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper
tax liability. 10 6 A professional tax advisor's opinion does not necessarily
satisfy reasonable cause, but the court examines the validity of the
taxpayer's reliance by looking to the quality and objectivity of the tax
advisor's opinion. 107
Here, Patterson and Nix obtained legal advice from tax attorneys and
accountants, who wrote detailed opinions based on reasonable
interpretations of the tax law. 108 Patterson and Nix also provided all
relevant facts to inform the tax opinion. 0 9 Therefore, the tax opinion was a
sufficient basis upon which Patterson and Nix could rely." 10 Patterson and
Nix relied on this opinion in good faith, being unaware of the understanding
between Presidio and the Bank that the transaction was designed solely to
generate tax losses.111 As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that Patterson and Nix carried their burden of demonstrating
reasonable cause and held that Patterson and Nix were not subject to the
understatement penalties. 112
b. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States
Long Term is a Second Circuit case involving a five-step transaction
designed to create a tax deductible loss of $400 million.113 The Second
Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut's
holding that the transaction lacked economic substance.' 14 The transaction
at issue in Long Term is complex and technical, but the salient facts are
simplified as follows and involved the "creation and cloning of an artificial
loss that was marketed at least twice and hidden on the tax return by
104. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
106. See Klamath, 568 F.3d at 548.
107. Seeid.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901 (E.D.
Tex. 2007).
112. See Klamath, 568 F.3d at 548.
113. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127-28 (D.
Conn. 2004), affd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
114. See Long Term, 150 F. App'x at 42. Henceforth, this Note will refer to the district
court's opinion, which contains the details lacking in the circuit court opinion. The district
court's opinion has been praised for its thorough analysis of the ESD. See Keinan, It Is Time,
supra note 39, at 30. In addition, because the technical details surrounding the transaction
are complex, Professor Alvin Warren's case analysis informs this Note's explication of the
case. See Alvin C. Warren Jr., Understanding Long Term Capital, 106 TAx NOTES 681, 681
(2005).
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taxpayers whose business was unrelated to the origin of the loss. 1 1 5 The
first step involved the creation of a foreign entity, Onslow Trading
Company (Onslow), which was to receive lease income from preexisting
leases of computer hardware and trucks in exchange for making a $400
million deposit to cover the exposure of the lease payments. 116 This step
had the purpose of assigning $400 million in lease income to a foreign
entity that would not be subject to U.S. income taxes. 1 7 Step two was the
creation of a controlled subsidiary to which Onslow contributed its $400
million of lease deposits and exposure obligations.1 18 In exchange, Onslow
received four million dollars of the subsidiary's preferred stock."19 The
subsidiary was essentially purchasing Onslow's $400 million in exposure
obligations as a deductible loss. 120 In step three, Onslow sold its subsidiary
preferred stock to Long Term Capital Portfolio. 121 Long Term Capital
Portfolio was traceable to individual principals who formed Long Term
Capital Management, which had a partnership interest in Long Term
Capital Partners, which in turn had a partnership interest in Long Term
Capital Portfolio (collectively Long Term). 122 This had the effect of giving
Long Term four million dollars in the subsidiary's preferred stock, which
had a tax deductible base of $400 million that had stayed with the
subsidiary. 123 In step four, Long Term secured a fifty million dollar
investment from investors through the bank UBS. 124 In step five, Long
Term sold some of the preferred stock it had purchased from Onslow for
one million dollars, which had a book value of $107 million, resulting in an
artificial loss of $106 million that was allocated to the principal-partners of
Long Term Capital Management. 125
The IRS disallowed the $106 million in deductions claimed by the
partners of Long Term Capital Management, and then assessed accuracy-
related penalties for their understatement of taxes. 126 The district court
agreed with IRS's conclusion that the transaction lacked economic
substance and validated the assessment of penalties. 127  Long Term
asserted, inter alia, that the understatement penalty should not apply to it
based on the reasonable cause exception. 128
115. See Warren, supra note 114, at 695; infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
116. See Warren, supra note 114, at 681-83.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 683.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 683-84.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 684-85.
124. See id. at 685.
125. See id. at 685-86.
126. See id. at 686-87.
127. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.
Conn. 2004), aff'd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
128. See Warren, supra note 114, at 692. Long Term also asserted the defense that its tax
treatment was supported by substantial authority and reasonable belief, which would mean
either that there was no understatement of tax liability or that its understatement amount
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In analyzing Long Term's reasonable cause defense, the court noted that
whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause requires a case by case
analysis, considering all pertinent facts and circumstances. 129 Like the
court in Klamath, the district court noted that the most important factor in
determining whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good
faith is the extent to which the taxpayer attempted to assess the proper tax
liability. 130 Then, the court made an important distinction with regard to
reliance on professional tax advice-reliance on professional tax advice
alone does not establish reasonable cause and good faith but, rather, such
reliance must be reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. 131
Reasonability requires two elements: First, the professional tax advice must
be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances as well as laws relating
to those facts, which requires that the taxpayer fully disclose all facts
relevant to the proper tax treatment as well as the purpose for entering into
the transaction.1 32 Second, the advice cannot be based on unreasonable
factual and legal assumptions, including inaccurate assumptions about the
taxpayer's purpose for entering into the transaction or for structuring it in a
particular manner.1 33
The district court then held that Long Term failed to establish reasonable
cause and good faith for several reasons. 134 First, the legal tax opinion
upon which Long Term claims to have relied was not received by Long
Term until after Long Term filed its tax return. 135 Second, even if the legal
opinion had been received in a timely manner, Long Term could not
demonstrate that the legal opinion was based on all pertinent facts or that
such opinion did not rely on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions.' 36
The district court described the legal opinion as containing minimal legal
analysis and only a brief discussion of basic facts, which amounted to
"superficial pronouncements asking the Court to 'trust US.' ' 137
Additionally, even if the legal opinion was substantively sufficient, the
partners of Long Term Capital Management did not review it. 138 Lastly,
Long Term failed to act in good faith by attempting to conceal the tax
losses by reporting them under the line item "Net Unrealized Gains" and
would be reduced by the portion attributable to substantial authority and reasonable belief.
See id. Substantial authority is an objective analysis of the law, which looks to whether the
taxpayer had substantial legal authority supporting his tax treatment and, if so, reduces the
understatement amount by the portion attributable to that substantial authority. Here, the
district court held that Long Term lacked substantial authority because it could not
demonstrate any authority that recognizes tax deductible losses arising from noneconomic
substance transactions. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 201-05.
129. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
130. See id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)).
131. See id. at 205-06.
132. See id. at 206 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)).
133. See id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)).
134. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
135. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 206-07; Warren, supra note 114, at 693.
136. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 209; Warren, supra note 114, at 693.
137. Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11; see Warren, supra note 114, at 693.
138. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
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netting the tax losses against unrelated capital gains. 139 This was done to
hide the large tax loss it attempted to claim, which could have triggered an
IRS audit. 140  In sum, Long Term could not carry the burden of
demonstrating that it had reasonable cause and good faith in relying on the
professional tax advice, and the understatement penalty was upheld. 141
C. Legislative Proposals To Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine
Part L.A discussed the ESD under common law and noted the unresolved
circuit split regarding the varying forms of the doctrine. Part I.B described
accuracy-related penalties assessed under the I.R.C. for noneconomic
substance transactions. This section of the Note summarizes legislative
attempts to codify the common-law ESD, which includes defining the
penalty standard under the I.R.C. Part I.C. 1 identifies the objectives sought
by prior legislative proposals between 1999 and 2007. Part I.C.2 describes
a 2009 proposal, H.R. 3200.
1. Reasons Behind Legislative Efforts To Codify the Economic Substance
Doctrine Between 1999 and 2007
This section addresses the numerous legislative attempts to codify the
ESD into the I.R.C., beginning in 1999. Three main reasons were purported
to be the goals behind codification: (1) deter aggressive noneconomic
substance transactions, (2) clarify the ESD by codifying one definition of
the doctrine, and (3) raise federal revenue by assessing tax penalties for
noneconomic substance transactions. This section elaborates on these
reasons and gives examples of prior legislation between 1999 and 2007,
which sought to achieve these aims.
a. Deter Noneconomic Substance Transactions and Tax Avoidance
As an initial policy matter, noneconomic substance transactions are seen
as hurtful to the economy and to be dealt with in a manner that deters such
transactions. 142  Proponents argue that the strong need for deterrence
justifies codification of the ESD. 143 The codified ESD is argued to be a
more effective deterrent than the common-law doctrine, as demonstrated by
139. See id.; Warren, supra note 114, at 693.
140. See Long Term, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
141. See id. at211-12.
142. See Corporate Tax Reform: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 33 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing on Corporate
Tax Reform] (statement of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 09_househearings&docid =
f:30445.pdf.
143. See id. at 36-37 (statement of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA) (citing
reports by the American Bar Association, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and Tax Executive Institute).
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other targeted legislation that drove behavior and deterred misconduct. 144
The proposals throughout the years, discussed in greater detail in later
sections of this Note, have had the overarching purpose of bolstering the
federal government's ability to combat tax shelters. 145
b. Codify One Definition of the Test for Economic Substance
Another goal of the codification effort is to define one uniform
application of the doctrine. 146 As demonstrated in Part I.A.2, the circuit
courts are split on whether the two prongs of the ESD should be used
conjunctively or disjunctively. 147 In addition, each of the two prongs is
defined using various factors. 148 This lack of uniformity is a prominent
reason behind legislative efforts to codify one definition of what constitutes
a noneconomic substance transaction. 149
In 1999, the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation first
discussed the possibility of codifying the ESD as one approach to combat
tax shelters. 150 The ESD would be codified as a one-prong test using the
objective economic benefit prong. 151 During the 2001-2002 congressional
sessions, two House bills proposed that the ESD be codified into the I.R.C.
as a two-prong conjunctive test. 152 During the 2003-2004 congressional
sessions, the Senate proposed three bills, 53 the notable one being S. 1637,
the Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act (JOBS Act).154
144. See id. at 33-34, 37 (statement of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA)
(noting that section 469 enacted a "passive loss provision," which has been effective in
deterring real estate and similar tax shelters, and that the forty percent penalty under the
proposal will have greater "bite" than existing antishelter provisions).
145. See TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 25 (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY DEP'T ON 2010 REVENUE
PROPOSALS], available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/gmbk09.pdf
(explaining that the 2009 proposal to codify the ESD and increase the penalty will deter
transactions intended for tax avoidance); TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 125 (2000), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/gmbkOO.pdf (stating that the 1999 legislative
proposal to codify the ESD was intended to strengthen the Treasury Department's overall tax
shelter strategy); Yoram Keinan, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508-1 Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio (BNA) § VIII(C)(1) (2007), available at TMFEDPORT No. 508 s VIII (Westlaw)
(noting that the 2004 legislative proposal to codify the ESD under the Jumpstart Our
Business Strength Act (JOBS Act) was intended to deter noneconomic substance
transactions).
146. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
147. See supra Part I.A.2.
148. See supra Part I.A.2.
149. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(A).
150. See id. § VIII(B)(1) & n.1225.
151. See id. § VIII(B)(I).
152. See id. § VIII(B)(2) & n.1230 (identifying two House bills, H.R. 2520 and H.R.
5095, that proposed codification of the ESD as part of I.R.C. § 7701).
153. See id. § VIII(B)(3) & nn.1231-32 (stating that the three Senate bills introduced in
the 108th Congress, S. 476, S. 1054, and S. 1637, were substantively unchanged from the
House bills submitted during the 107th Congress).
154. See id. § VIII(C) (noting that the JOBS Act passed the Senate by a 92-5 vote then
became signed into law).
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The 2004 JOBS Act acknowledged that circuit courts were applying the
ESD inconsistently 155 and proposed to define the ESD as a two-prong
conjunctive test. 156  Specifically, a transaction would have economic
substance if it changes the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful
way, and the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into the
transaction with a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose. 157 The
court would retain the discretion to determine if the ESD was relevant in a
given case. 158 The JOBS Act passed into law on October 22, 2004,159 but
excluded the portions of the bill regarding the codification of the ESD and
the accompanying penalty provision. 160
In 2005 during the 109th Congress, the Joint Committee on Taxation
(JCT) proposed its version of a codification proposal, noting that the lack of
clarity produces unfairness, which is compounded by the high tax
penalty. 161 The JCT's 2005 proposal differed from the JOBS Act of 2004
in three key aspects. First, the subjective prong would require that the
business purpose of the transaction be substantial and "bear a reasonable
relationship to the taxpayer's normal business operations or investment
activities." 162 This change was premised on the idea that a transaction that
bears no relationship to the taxpayer's normal business activities may signal
that it was entered into merely for tax purposes. 163 Second, courts would be
able to invalidate an entire transaction that consists of portions seeking
nontax purposes as well as portions seeking only tax avoidance. 164 Third,
the ESD would be used by courts only for certain "applicable transactions,"
defining six such categories and giving the Treasury authority to add or
155. See id. § VIII(C)(1).
156. See id. § VIII(C)(2).
157. See id. § VIII(C)(3). There is criticism that this proposal purported to define the
ESD in a manner inconsistent with common-law precedent. First, the objective economic
benefit prong under the proposal would use a "change in economic position" test, which
would be broader than the "reasonable expectation for profit" test applied by the courts.
Second, the subjective business purpose prong under the proposal would require, on top of a
nontax purpose, a reasonable means to achieve it, and, hence, would be more restrictive than
the common-law standard. See id. § VIII(C)(3)-(4) & nn. 1242-45.
158. See id. § VIII(C)(2) (noting that the proposed standard would apply only upon a
court's determination that the ESD is relevant in a case, without which the legislation would
have no effect).
159. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified at 26 USC § 114 (2006)).
160. See id. § VIII(C)(7).
161. See id. § VIII(D)(1).
162. See id. § VIII(D)(4).
163. See id. § VIII(D)(4) n.1259.
164. See id. § VIII(D)(4). In its description of the 2007 proposal, S. 2242, the Senate
Committee on Finance noted that courts would have the authority to bifurcate a transaction,
such that the court could aggregate or disaggregate portions of the transaction and disallow it
in its entirety or only those portions motivated by tax avoidance. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
FIN., 1 10TH CONG., ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 5 (2007) [hereinafter STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON FIN.], available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007/
Leg%20110%20100407agamendment.pdf.
2010] 2029
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
delete from this list of applicable transactions. 165 Congress did not adopt
the 2005 JCT proposal. 66
In 2007, a codification proposal came as part of the Heartland, Habitat,
Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007.167 This Senate proposal would also
define the ESD using a two-prong conjunctive test, requiring the transaction
to change the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from
federal income tax benefits and to have a substantial nontax purpose. 168
The 2007 proposal differed from prior proposals in that it excluded from the
subjective prong the requirement of either a reasonable means of
accomplishing the nontax purpose, as in the 2004 JOBS Act, or a
reasonable relationship to the taxpayer's normal business activities, as in
the 2005 proposal. 169 Like prior bills, Congress did not adopt the 2007
proposal. 170
c. Raise Federal Revenue Through Tax Penalties
Legislative proposals to codify the ESD began to include a penalty
provision with the JOBS Act of 2004, which provided that tax penalties
would be assessed for noneconomic substance transactions as an explicit
category subject to accuracy-related penalties under the I.R.C. 171 Penalties
assessed for noneconomic substance transactions act as revenue offsets
against federal spending. 172 The assessment of this penalty as a revenue
raiser for the federal government has been noted by some as one of the
driving forces behind the codification effort. 173
165. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(D)(6). The six categories of applicable
transactions were the following: (1) "offsetting positions," or transactions by which the
taxpayer can recognize a loss without recognizing an offsetting gain in the same period; (2)
transactions that create or increase a loss or reduce a gain by way of a disparity between
basis and fair market value; (3) transactions that create or increase a gain in an asset, which
do not result in a recognizable loss if the asset is sold at fair market value; (4) transactions
with tax-indifferent parties; (5) transactions in which the taxpayer disposes of property in
less than a forty-five day holding period; and (6) transactions in which certain deductions are
permitted for federal tax purposes but not for financial accounting purposes. See id.
166. See id. § VIII(A) (noting that Congress has not adopted any of the proposals to date).
167. S. 2242, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110 cong_reports&docid=f:sr206.pdf.
168. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 164, at 5.
169. See id.
170. See Govtrack.us, S. 2242: Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of
2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-2242 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
171. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(C)(7).
172. See TREASURY DEP'T ON 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 145, at i (listing the
codification of ESD as a category of revenue changes in the President's 2010 budget);
Codifying the Economic Substance Doctrine, FED. TAX ADVISORY (Alston Bird LLP, D.C.),
Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://www.alston.com/files/Publication/bc42675d-c232-40a5-
af88-00b41 f3ba394/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1 bc7cd 19-d5ef-4bb5-9662-
00f3d49c9e9a/FedTaxReport%204-1-09%20(2).pdf; Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Despite
Widespread Opposition, Congress Should Codify the ESD, 110 TAX NOTES 781, 781 (2006).
173. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress, 118
TAX NOTES 1405, 1410 (2008) (quoting commentators' observations on the role of the
penalty provision as a revenue raiser).
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The JOBS Act proposed that a penalty be assessed at forty percent of the
understatement amount resulting from the disallowance of a tax deduction,
which would be reduced to twenty percent with adequate disclosure of all
relevant facts surrounding the transaction.1 74 These penalties, along with
the purported heightened deterrent effect of the codified ESD, were
estimated to generate over thirteen billion dollars in federal revenue over a
ten-year period between 2004 and 2013.175 The penalty provision in the
JOBS Act was excluded from the version of the bill signed into law on
October 22, 2004.176
The 2005 proposals were substantially similar to the 2004 JOBS Act
except that they proposed a major change to administer the penalty on a
strict liability basis. 177 The strict liability standard, which is discussed
further in Part I.C.2.b, meant that the taxpayer's reliance on the advice of a
tax professional could not serve as a defense to the penalty. 17 8 One of the
2005 proposals, S. 2020, was estimated to generate fifteen billion dollars
from codifying the ESD. 179
In the 2007 proposal, 180 the penalty was adjusted to thirty percent, which
would be reduced to twenty percent if the taxpayer adequately disclosed the
facts surrounding the transaction.181 Like the 2005 proposals, the 2007
proposal would administer the penalty on a strict liability basis, precluding
the taxpayer from asserting a defense to the penalty based on outside tax
opinions or in-house analyses tending to demonstrate reasonable cause. 182
Estimates of the revenue to be generated by the several 2007 proposals,
including S. 2242, ranged between $3.5 billion and $10 billion. 183
174. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(C)(7).
175. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS
OF THE CHAIRMAN'S MARK OF S. 1637, THE "JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH ('JOBS')
ACT" (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/
leg092603revtble.pdf.
176. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004); Keinan, supra note 145,
§ VIII(C)(7).
177. See id. § VIII(D).
178. See id.; infra Part I.C.2.b.
179. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 781 (citing STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
109TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN S. 2020,
"THE TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005" AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON NOVEMBER 18, 2005 (Comm.
Print 2005), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-82-05r.pdf).
180. Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, S. 2242, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 10-
congreports&docid=f:sr206.pdf.
181. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 164, at 13.
182. See id.
183. See Donald L. Korb, Codification of the Judicial Economic Substance Doctrine, in
TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING 2008, at 379, 382-87 (PLI Tax Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 852, 2008).
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2. 2009 Proposal by the 111 th Congress: H.R. 3200
One of the 2009 proposals for codification of the ESD was part of
America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, or H.R. 3200.184 H.R.
3200 contained sections 452 and 453, respectively entitled "Codification of
Economic Substance Doctrine" and "Penalties for Underpayments."' 185 The
former section defined how the ESD should be codified, and the latter
section specified how the penalty provision should be incorporated into the
I.R.C. 186
a. Section 452: Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine
H.R. 3200 proposed to codify ESD into the I.R.C. as an amendment to
section 7701, which covers procedural and administrative definitions under
the I.R.C. i8 7 The ESD would be codified as a two-prong conjunctive test,
requiring that (1) the transaction change the taxpayer's economic position in
a meaningful way apart from reducing federal tax and that (2) the taxpayer
have a substantial nontax business purpose for entering into the
transaction.' 88 The nontax business purpose prong is not satisfied by the
taxpayer's purpose to achieve a financial accounting benefit if such
financial accounting benefit is intended to achieve a reduction of tax.189
The proposal included a "special rule where taxpayer relies on profit
potential," which stated that a profit potential must have a "present value of
the reasonably expected pre-tax profit [that is] substantial in relation to the
present value of the expected net tax benefits" arising from the
transaction. 190 Courts would retain the discretion to determine when the
ESD applies in a particular case. 191 In addition, the proposal stated that
other common-law doctrines would not be affected by the proposal. 192
Lastly, the Treasury Department would have authority to publish
regulations to carry out the purpose of the proposal. 193
184. See America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.
(2009). This Note analyzes the proposal to adopt a strict liability penalty standard for
noneconomic substance transactions under the framework of H.R. 3200. On October 29,
2009, H.R. 3200 was superseded by a similar bill, H.R. 3962. This change does not impact
this Note's analysis for two reasons: First, the new bill contains a penalty provision identical
to that in H.R. 3200. Second, this Note's discussion of the penalty standard does not rely on
the particulars of any one bill but addresses the broader policy considerations of any
legislation that proposes to adopt a strict liability penalty standard for noneconomic
substance transactions. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
185. See H.R. 3200 §§ 452-453.
186. See id.
187. I.R.C. § 7701 (2006); see H.R. 3200 § 452(a).
188. H.R. 3200 § 452(a)(1).
189. Id. § 452(a)(4).
190. Id. § 452(a)(2).
191. See id. § 452(a)(5)(D).
192. Id. § 452(a)(5)(C).
193. Id. § 452(a)(6).
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b. Section 453: Penalties for Underpayments
H.R. 3200 section 453 was the penalty provision, which was an
important component of the proposal and fit into the goal of deterring tax
shelters. 194  The penalty provision proposed to enact three important
amendments to existing accuracy-related penalties and the reasonable cause
exception, to be discussed below. 195 The penalty provision was estimated
to raise $3.6 billion of federal revenue over a ten-year period between 2010
and 2019.196
The first provision in section 453 was to amend I.R.C. section 6662(b) to
add noneconomic substance transactions as a sixth category of
underpayments giving rise to a penalty. 197 A twenty percent penalty would
be imposed, calculated as a percent of the understatement amount resulting
from the disallowance of the claimed tax deduction. 198  The second
provision of section 453 proposed a heighted penalty of forty percent where
a taxpayer failed to adequately disclose all relevant facts surrounding the
tax treatment of an item at issue. 199
The third change proposed by H.R. 3200 is the source of the conflict
addressed in this Note. The proposal would amend section 6664, which
currently provides that no penalty shall apply to underpayments for which
reasonable cause and good faith can be shown on the part of the
taxpayer.200 Under the proposal, the reasonable cause exception would be
inapplicable to noneconomic substance transactions, 20 1 which means that as
long as the transaction is deemed to lack economic substance, the section
6662 understatement penalty would apply, and the taxpayer would be
precluded from asserting the reasonable cause exception as a defense to the
penalty. 20 2 Hence, the taxpayer has no opportunity to demonstrate that his
tax position is substantiated by professional tax opinions or in-house
analyses. 203  The penalty cannot be abated unless the underlying
understatement amount is recalculated under a different set of rules.
204
Stated another way, the penalty can only be abated in proportion to an
194. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 48 (stating that the penalty
was intended to deter aggressive tax positions by increasing the cost of entering
noneconomic substance transactions).
195. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
196. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 40 n. 104 (noting that for its
budgetary estimate, the JCT has made the same assumptions on the penalty and interest
disallowances as H.R. 2419 and S. 2242); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG.,
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3200, THE "AMERICA'S
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CHOICES ACT OF 2009," at 2 (Comm. Print 2009).
197. H.R. 3200 § 453(a)(1).
198. I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006); H.R. 3200 § 453(a)(1).
199. H.R. 3200 § 453(a)(2).
200. I.R.C. § 6664(c); see also supra Part I.B.2.
201. H.R. 3200 § 453(b).
202. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION ON H.R. 3200, supra note 18, at 49.
203. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION ON H.R. 3200, supra note 18, at 49.
204. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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abatement of the underlying tax liability.2°5 The changes proposed by
section 453 would effectively make the penalty standard one of strict
liability. 20 6
In summary, H.R. 3200's penalty provision would have imposed a
twenty percent penalty for underpayment of income tax that results from the
disallowance of a tax benefit claimed by a taxpayer in a noneconomic
substance transaction.20 7 Should the taxpayer fail to disclose all relevant
facts surrounding the tax treatment of an item in the transaction, he is
subject to a forty percent penalty of the underpayment. 20 8 The taxpayer
would no longer have the opportunity to avoid the penalty by asserting the
reasonable cause exception but would be penalized under the strict liability
standard. 209 This last provision, which proposed to change the penalty
standard from reasonable cause to strict liability, is the focus of the debate
in Part II, where this Note explores the question of whether the strict
liability penalty standard is appropriate for application with the ESD.
II. THE DEBATE REGARDING THE TAX PENALTY STANDARD: ARGUMENTS
FOR AND AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY
Part II examines arguments for and against the use of strict liability to
assess penalties for noneconomic substance transactions. The debate
regarding the strict liability penalty takes place within the larger context of
the debate around codification of the ESD generally, in which the
arguments for and against codification necessarily implicate the propriety of
the penalty provisions contained therein.210 Part II.A examines the
arguments in favor of strict liability as espoused by its proponents. Part
II.B examines arguments against strict liability as espoused by its
opponents.
A. Proponents' Arguments in Favor of the Strict Liability Penalty Standard
This section of the Note considers arguments proffered by those who
favor the strict liability standard. Proponents of strict liability argue that
strict liability should be adopted in order to (1) better deter noneconomic
substance transactions, (2) raise revenue for the federal government through
the assessment of penalties, and (3) curtail the promotion of these tax
evasion tools by tax professionals.
205. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63-64.
206. See id.; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION ON H.R. 3200, supra note 18, at 49; supra
notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
210. See Clinton Stretch, Matthew Lay & John Galotto, Economic Substance and Strict
Liability Do Not Mix, 123 TAX NOTES 1357, 1357 & nn.2-5 (2009).
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1. Strict Liability Is a Stronger Deterrent to Noneconomic Substance
Transactions Relative to Existing Law
The proposed penalty standard imposes a strict liability penalty for
noneconomic substance transactions. 211 There is argument that a higher
and stricter penalty is needed to better deter noneconomic substance
transactions, 212 based on the observation that the current tax penalty regime
does not sufficiently deter aggressive tax shelter transactions.213  A
taxpayer can gamble, in a sense, on a tax shelter transaction with the upside
of obtaining the tax benefit and the downside of losing the tax benefit he
attempted to realize.214 This leaves him in a position that is no worse than
the one he would be in without the tax shelter transaction. 215 Similarly,
current IRS guidelines for settling tax shelter cases are said to be ineffective
at deterring tax shelters because the taxpayer does not stand to be
sufficiently disadvantaged from a finding that the transaction lacked
economic substance. 216 These observations lead the proponents of strict
liability to argue that the reasonable cause exception leaves too much
"wiggle room" for the sophisticated taxpayer and too many opportunities to
convince IRS or a court to validate a purely tax-motivated transaction. 217
Thus, the proponents advocate a strict liability standard, which alters the
cost-benefit analysis of these taxpayers and increases the stakes should their
transactions be deemed to lack economic substance. 218 This gives the
taxpayer incentive to avoid tax shelter transactions, thereby "level[ing] the
211. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
212. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63-65.
213. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 33-34, 37 (statement of
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA).
214. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 30, at 39-40 (statement of Lindy
Paull, Chief of Staff, J. Comm. on Taxation); Zachary Nahass, Comment, Codifying the
Economic Substance Doctrine: A Proposal on the Doorstep of Usefulness, 58 ADMIN. L.
REv. 247, 267 (2006); Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax Policy Gone Wild:
Harsh Penalties as Revenue Raisers, 115 TAX NOTES 79, 81 (2007) (arguing that the strict
liability penalty encourages taxpayers to take their chances of being audited rather than
voluntarily disclosing the transaction because their disclosure and good-faith attempt at
compliance does not mitigate their chances of being penalized).
215. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 81.
216. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63-64 & n.203.
217. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 34-36 (statement of
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA); I.R.S. Notice CC-2004-036 (Sept. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2004-036.pdf (pronouncing that tax
penalties should not be bargained away if they are to deter tax shelter transactions).
218. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 34-36 (statement of
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA); Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra
note 30, at 39-40 (statement of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff, J. Comm. on Taxation)
(suggesting that the existing tax penalty regime does not sufficiently deter tax shelter
transactions because the underpayment penalty is relative to the tax benefit attempted to be
realized by the taxpayer); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63-64 & n.204
(noting that proponents say tax advisors will look to existing case law to advise their clients
that a tax penalty will apply if the transaction fails on ESD).
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playing field between more aggressive and more conservative practitioners
and their clients. '219
2. Strict Liability Helps Raise Revenue for the Federal Government
The federal tax gap is the difference between what taxpayers actually
owe in taxes and what they actually pay.220 The largest portion of the tax
gap is a result of underreporting,221 with a 2008 estimate approximating that
eighty-three percent of the tax gap, or $285 billion, is attributable to
underreporting. 222 Abusive tax shelters contribute to the underreporting
that produces the federal tax gap. 223 This is seen as evidence that the
penalty system is not effectively deterring tax shelters. 224 Based on the
argument that reducing the complexity of the Code alleviates
underreporting, 225 strict liability would help close the tax gap because it can
be administered simply as a bright-line rule by eliminating opportunities for
taxpayers to explain away violations using the reasonable cause
exception. 226
3. Strict Liability Discourages Tax Professionals from Promoting Tax
Evasion Tools Such as Noneconomic Substance Transactions
Scholars have criticized tax professionals' marketing of legal opinions or
accounting tools, which are used to validate tax shelter transactions. 227
219. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 63 (citing Hearing on
Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 33 (statement of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr.,
Professor, UCLA)).
220. See Uncollected Taxes: Can We Reduce the $300 Billion Tax Gap?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Financial Management, Government Information, and
International Security of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
109th Cong. 95 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on the Tax Gap], available at
http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109s/24444.pdf (statement of J. Russell George,
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration). The tax gap is composed primarily of
(1) unfiled tax returns, (2) underreported income on filed returns, and (3) underpaid taxes on
filed returns. See id.
221. See id. at 96 fig. 1. For a discussion of the federal tax gap and information reporting
as a means to reduce it, see generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To
Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1733 (2010).
222. 2 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08 tas-arc.vol2.pdf.
223. See William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Summer 2010), available at http://www.law.siu.edu/facstaff/
Drennan/Drennan-forthcoming%200kla%20LR%2Oarticle%205-09.pdf.
224. See id.
225. See Hearing on the Tax Gap, supra note 220, at 100-03 (statement of J. Russell
George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration).
226. See id. at 101-03 (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration) (arguing that complex tax laws permit taxpayers to exploit "angles"
such as tax shelters but simultaneously require greater IRS resources to fight such abusive
behavior).
227. See Warren, supra note 114, at 695 (stating that tax professionals have marketed tax
shelter transactions as tax products, and such behavior will only change if courts uphold
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Akin to the argument that the current penalty regime is insufficient to deter
noneconomic substance transactions, a similar argument is that tax
professionals have become promoters of these noneconomic substance
transactions and that this problem should be curtailed by penalizing the
taxpayer on a strict liability basis.228  The strict liability penalty for
taxpayers would work in conjunction with penalties assessed on tax
professionals for failing to comply with requirements of disclosure and
confidence levels in issuing tax opinions that serve as substantial bases for
taxpayers' tax positions.22 9
B. Opponents'Arguments Against the Strict Liability Penalty Standard
Opponents of strict liability argue that the strict liability penalty standard
is not appropriate for noneconomic substance transactions. 230 At least one
commentator has suggested that the strict liability penalty is the most
flawed aspect of the proposed codification of ESD.231  Strict liability
penalties are rarely used in federal tax law. 232 In fact, it is reported that of
the $29.5 billion in tax penalties assessed by the IRS in 2007, 37.6% were
abated in whole or in part, illustrating the significant role of IRS's ability to
abate tax penalties. 233 Opponents of the proposed strict liability standard
espouse four main arguments: (1) strict liability contravenes broader tax
penalty policies and is unfair to the taxpayer, (2) strict liability penalties
should not be imposed as revenue raisers, (3) strict liability should not be
penalties); Federal Tax Crimes, http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2009/07/other-players-
in-abusive-tax-shelters.html (July 24, 2009, 12:14 CST) (commenting on Marvin
Chirelstein's Letter to the Editor in Tax Notes expressing alarm about law firms promoting
tax shelters and selling legal opinions validating tax shelters).
228. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 37 (statement of Samuel
C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA) (supporting the proposed penalty provision and arguing
against organizations that say current laws sufficiently address the problem of tax
professionals who promote tax shelter transactions).
229. See Memorandum from the A.B.A. Tax Section to Chairmen and Ranking Members
of the House and Senate, Statement of Policy Favoring Reform of Federal Civil Tax
Penalties (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform],
available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2009/09042 1 statemntciviltaxpenalties.pdf.
For the tax professional's standard of conduct, see 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/circular 230.pdf.
230. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 64-65; VanderWolk, supra
note 64, at 548, 552; Memorandum from the A.B.A. Tax Section to Chairman Baucus and
Ranking Member Grassley, Proposed Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine 11-
12 (Apr. 12, 2007) [hereinafter A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification], available at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2007/070412codificationeconsubdoc.pdf; AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, PENALTY REFORM TASK FORCE, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX
PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 4 (2009) [hereinafter AICPA], available at
http://www.aicpa.org/download/news/2009/AICPA-report-civil-tax-penalty-reform.pdf.
231. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1357.
232. See id. at 1357-58 (noting that the 6600 and 6700 series of the I.R.C. contain seven
strict liability penalties compared to approximately fifty-five provisions with the reasonable
cause exception).
233. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS SHOULD
EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN To FOCUS ITS EFFORTS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09567.pdf.
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used with a fluid and complex doctrine such as the ESD, and (4) strict
liability may produce unintended consequences.
1. Strict Liability Contravenes Broader Tax Penalty Policies and Is Unfair
to the Taxpayer
A basic premise of the I.R.C. is to encourage taxpayers' voluntary
compliance to the Code.234  That premise was enacted through the
Improved Penalty and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT) twenty years ago,
which established that civil tax penalties should encourage taxpayers to
voluntarily comply with the Code.235 IMPACT was heavily influenced by
recommendations from the IRS Task Force, which was composed of
members of the IRS and Treasury Department who conducted an in-depth
study in collaboration with government officials, taxpayers, private
practitioners, and professional organizations to examine civil tax
penalties. 236 The IRS Task Force concluded that four factors are crucial to
encourage compliance to the Code: fairness, understandability,
effectiveness, and ease of administration. 237  Similarly, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 2009 report to the Senate
Finance Committee maintained that fairness and voluntary compliance are
essential to the administration of the I.R.C., based on its extensive study
involving review of key IRS policy documents and academic studies,
interviews with four IRS divisions and representatives of twenty-five states,
and collaboration with the Federation of Tax Administrators, IRS Office of
Tax Shelter Analysis, the Treasury Department, and others. 238
The above studies established that tax penalties should be administered in
a fair and equitable manner, which means penalties should distinguish
taxpayers who commit culpable conduct from those who in good faith
attempt to comply with the Code. 239 In order to be fair, penalty rules
should be flexible to differentiate factual circumstances in each case and
should distinguish willful from negligent misconduct.240 Strict liability by
234. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 3; TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 4; AICPA, supra note 230, at 16-17 (citing I.R.S.
Policy Statement 20-1, Internal Revenue Manual pt. 1.2.20.1.1, 1-2, http://www.irs.gov/
irm/partl/irm_01-002-020.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010)); Stretch et al., supra note 210, at
1360.
235. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 1.
236. See id. at 2.
237. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7. These four principles mean
that tax penalties should be easily understood, avoid assessing multiple penalties for the
same misconduct, and treat all taxpayers in a fair and equitable manner. See AICPA, supra
note 230, at 3.
238. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 1-3. The ABA Tax
Section also believes that the guiding principles have not changed in the last twenty years.
See A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 5.
239. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 3.
240. See id. (positing that penalties should encourage voluntary compliance by
differentiating between taxpayers who attempt good-faith compliance with the tax law and
those who deliberately violate the laws); Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359-60; A.B.A.
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definition imposes the penalty regardless of whether the taxpayer
substantially complied with the Code or made a good-faith attempt to do
so. 241 Hence, opponents of the strict liability standard argue that strict
liability is unfair to the taxpayer, particularly given the higher penalty of
forty percent, and would discourage voluntary compliance as well as violate
the basic tenets of the Code.242 Particularly with regard to noneconomic
substance transactions, the argument is that strict liability is not appropriate
because it precludes the ability of courts to analyze the facts and
circumstances of each case.243
In its 2008 report to Congress, the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA)
observed the lack of fairness in penalties that are imposed without
determining whether the taxpayer's conduct warrants a penalty or whether
the penalty is proportional to the misconduct.244 The Tax Section of the
American Bar Association (ABA) shares the NTA's concern regarding
penalties that are imposed without giving the taxpayer the opportunity to
demonstrate that penalties should not be imposed in his case.245 Hence, the
ABA Tax Section recommends that all tax penalties should include a
reasonable cause and good-faith defense. 246 Similarly, NTA advocates that
reasonable cause exceptions should take priority over harsh penalties.247
Along the same lines, the IRS Policy Statement vows to provide the
taxpayer a "reasonable opportunity to provide evidence that the penalty
should not apply" and to fully consider any evidence that excuses the
penalty even if the IRS initially intended to impose the penalty.248
Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 4 (recommending that
"[i]nadvertent or excusable error should not be punished to the same degree (if at all) as
willful misconduct").
241. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
242. See infra notes 244-56 and accompanying text.
243. See A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 10 (citing
A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230). The ABA Tax Section would
recommend that instead of adopting a strict liability penalty, IRS resources should be
increased to allow the IRS to enforce its existing tools and penalties to combat tax shelters.
See id. The ABA Tax Section is supportive of penalty regimes that are based on disclosure,
rather than penalty regimes based on punishment and increased complexity. See id. at 4, 7-
10.
244. See id. at 8 (citing TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7-9). The
National Taxpayer Advocate report cites studies, including the IRS Task Force Reports, that
identify three components of perceived fairness in tax penalties: horizontal fairness,
proportionality, and procedural fairness. Horizontal equity requires that tax penalties be
administered in a manner that treats similarly situated taxpayers similarly, rather than
applying the same penalty to everyone regardless of a given taxpayer's effort to comply with
the tax code. To treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly, the IRS should inquire into the
taxpayer's level of sophistication, prior compliance history, and other factual circumstances.
See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7-9.
245. See A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 8.
246. See id. at 9.
247. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 8.
248. See I.R.S. Policy Statement 20-1, Internal Revenue Manual pt. 1.2.20.1.1, T 9,
http://www.irs.gov/irm/partl/irm_01-002-020.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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The criticism is that under the strict liability penalty standard, a taxpayer
would have no such opportunity to provide evidence to show that the
penalty should not be imposed. 249 The taxpayer gets no opportunity for
procedural due process prior to the assessment of penalties, 250 which is said
to preclude a fair application of penalties. 251  In addition, there is no
substantive due process because the proposed penalty does not define the
proper standard by which to administer the penalty. 252 After the penalty is
assessed, the taxpayer retains no meaningful opportunity for postassessment
relief253 because, while the IRS Commissioner may abate the penalty in
certain circumstances, such circumstances are not defined and the
Commissioner's decision is not subject to judicial review.254 Hence,
taxpayers with genuine mitigating circumstances would have no
opportunity to challenge the assessment of a penalty against him at any
stage of the penalty process. 255 The ABA Tax Section has recommended
that the taxpayer be given the opportunity to challenge noneconomic
substance transaction penalties both at the IRS Office of Appeals level and
in the courts.256
2. Strict Liability Penalties Should Not Be Imposed as Revenue Raisers
There is opposition to the use of penalties as revenue raisers for the
federal government. 257 Specifically, the penalty provisions contained in the
codification proposals are seen as attempting to raise revenue by imposing
high penalties designed to offset costs of other tax changes. 258  The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) voiced its
concern about the recent trend of tax penalties being assessed as revenue
raisers. 259 The AICPA also noted that the 2004 IRS Penalty Policy
Statement 260 shifted away from focusing on voluntary compliance in the
1980s toward a preference for assessing penalties. 261  The GAO also
249. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
250. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 82; Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
251. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359-60.
252. See id. at 1359.
253. See id.
254. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 66; Jackel, supra note 50, at
75; A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 10 & n.24 (referencing
2007 proposal).
255. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
256. See A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 13.
257. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 79.
258. See Ventry, supra note 173, at 1410. The ABA Tax Section also opposes using
penalties to offset tax expenditures because that incentivizes IRS to impose penalties at the
expense of evaluating whether the penalty is justified in each case. See A.B.A. Tax Section
on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 11.
259. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 4.
260. I.R.S. Policy Statement 20-1, Internal Revenue Manual pt. 1.2.20.1.1,
http://www.irs.gov/irm/partl/irm_01-002-020.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
261. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 17 ("While these policies appear reasonable on their
face, together, and with no ability for the agent to exercise discretion, they create an unfair
bias in favor of assertion of penalties which undermines the appearance of impartiality.").
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inferred that penalties are assessed on a cost-benefit basis from the trend
that certain small penalties are not assessed because the cost of developing
and asserting the penalty outweighs the penalty collected.262
The 2008 NTA report and the ABA Tax Section recommend that
penalties should aim to drive taxpayer behavior rather than to raise
government revenues. 263 The NTA report concluded that strict liability
does not comport with this objective because strict liability precludes IRS's
ability to reward taxpayers' good-faith attempts to comply with the Code
with an abatement of the penalty. 264 As a corollary, there is the additional
argument that strict liability penalties encourage the IRS to aggressively
assess penalties because the taxpayer has no opportunity to defend his tax
position through the use of a reasonable cause exception. 265 Hence, the use
of strict liability penalties to raise revenue is seen as unfair to the taxpayer
and detrimental to the tax policy of encouraging voluntary compliance with
the Code.266
3. Strict Liability Should Not Be Used with a Fluid and Complex Doctrine
Such as the Economic Substance Doctrine
Opponents of the strict liability standard note that the ESD is a doctrine
that remains complex and unclear under the proposal and that it is,
therefore, unsuitable for use with strict liability.267  Because it is
administered as a bright-line rule, strict liability is seen as useful and
appropriate only in areas of the law where the rules are simple and clear.268
The New York State Bar Association, despite supporting strict liability
penalties for tax-shelter-related understatements, opposed the use of strict
liability in the ESD, noting that the proposal leaves so much uncertainty
that using a strict liability standard in this context would be unfair to the
taxpayer.269 For reasons discussed below, opponents note that the codified
262. See id. at 4 (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 9).
263. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 3; A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform,
supra note 229, at 11. Treasury Regulation section 1.6694-2(d) identifies some factors that
the taxpayer can demonstrate to show reasonable cause, and these factors are aligned with
behavior that the Treasury and IRS want to encourage, such as employing tax professionals'
advice and performing due diligence to calculate the correct tax liability. See Stretch et al.,
supra note 210, at 1359.
264. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359-60.
265. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 79-80.
266. See id. at 79 ("The bottom line is that revenue raising through the use of strict
liability penalties is poor tax policy and an unsatisfactory rationale for harming our tax
system, which is built on the solid underpinnings of due process and voluntary
compliance.").
267. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1360; infra notes 271-85 and accompanying
text.
268. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 10 n.26; Stretch et al., supra
note 210, at 1360.
269. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1361 & n.32; A.B.A. Tax Section on Civil Tax
Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 8.
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ESD does not resolve the points of ambiguity in the doctrine and, therefore,
should not be used with strict liability.270
The ESD has been characterized as an inherently subjective analysis
involving a case by case review of the facts and circumstances. 271
According to the JCT, the codified ESD does not become a more objective
analysis but remains an inherently subjective test.272 The JCT notes a
number of cases in which the lower and appeals courts have reached
opposite outcomes on the same facts, 273 or different jurisdictions have
reached varying outcomes on cases with similar facts. 274 The proposal does
not address whether existing case law should be reversed on any particular
point.275 In addition, the codified ESD provides that a court will use its
discretion to decide if the ESD is even relevant to a given case, but does not
specify the circumstances under which the court should apply the ESD. 276
Opponents of strict liability also point out that the proposed statutory
language leaves many crucial elements undefined. 277 For example, in order
for a transaction to be valid under the proposal, the transaction must change
the taxpayer's economic position in a "meaningful way," and the taxpayer
must have a "substantial purpose" for entering into the transaction. 278 Yet,
what constitutes a "meaningful" change or a "substantial purpose" is not
defined in the proposal. 279 Similarly, where a taxpayer relies on profit
potential to justify the transaction, the proposal requires a "substantial"
amount of pretax profit potential relative to the net tax benefit.280 Yet, the
proposal does not define what level of profit potential is sufficient to pass
270. See infra notes 271-85 and accompanying text.
271. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 41; Korb, supra note 23, at
13-15; see also Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standard of
Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339, 342 (2009) (characterizing the economic substance analysis as
a factual, case by case analysis and arguing that the appellate courts should use a clearly
erroneous standard of review); Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 81 (stating that courts
have reached inconsistent rulings in recent decisions and "reasonable minds could reach
different conclusions"); supra note 67 and accompanying text (suggesting that the ESD may
involve a "smell test").
272. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 41.
273. See id. at 41 & n.106 (collecting cases).
274. See id. at 41 & n. 107 (collecting cases).
275. See id. at42 & n.108.
276. See America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111 th Cong.
§ 452(a)(5)(D) (2009); A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 10(noting that one of the several ambiguities of the codified ESD is whether the statute would
apply at all to a given transaction).
277. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 45; Stretch et al., supra note
210, at 1360.
278. See H.R. 3200 § 452(a)(1)(A)-(B).
279. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 82; Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1360.
280. H.R. 3200 § 452(a)(2).
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the test, or what happens when profit potential is not readily measurable.281
These terms have been used in different ways by different courts.282
One commentator characterized the codification as "replacing judicial
uncertainty with statutory uncertainty." 283  The argument is that a
taxpayer's good-faith effort to calculate the correct tax liability should be
considered in the assessment of penalties for noneconomic substance
transactions. 284 If instead taxpayers are penalized as a result of inconsistent
rulings, the legitimacy of the tax system could potentially be
undermined. 285
4. Strict Liability May Produce Unintended Consequences
Opponents of the strict liability standard predict unintended
consequences from the codification of the ESD and the accompanying strict
liability penalty. 286 The Senate Report to the predecessor of H.R. 3200287
admittedly recognized that a strictly rule-based system, which cannot
provide for every conceivable transaction, is not able to prevent all
unintended consequences. 288  Opponents note at least two unintended
consequences, one being increased litigation accompanied by decreased
taxpayer cooperation and disclosure, and the other being the possibility that
courts may hesitate to use the ESD. 289
Opponents expect increased litigation by taxpayers, especially with the
higher penalty.290 Former IRS Chief Counsel Korb characterizes the
codified ESD as the "seeds of the next tax shelter problem," which would
make litigation more complex and eliminate taxpayers' incentive to
cooperate with the IRS because cooperation will not mitigate the penalty. 291
Opponents argue that IRS resources would be deflected to fight litigation or
281. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 45; Bankman, supra note 36,
at 23-26.
282. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1360 (calling the elements an "amalgamation of
elements that ... do not reflect an economic substance test applied by any one court or any
one jurisdiction").
283. See id. at 1361.
284. See Jackel, supra note 50, at 75.
285. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 20-21; Hill & Minkovich, supra
note 214, at 81 (suspecting that where strict liability penalties are assessed regardless of
legitimate grounds for disagreement between IRS and the taxpayer, such a penalty policy
could "erode faith in our voluntary compliance system").
286. See infra notes 287-97 and accompanying text.
287. See S. REP. No. 109-336, at 138 (2006) (report of the Senate Committee on Finance
accompanying the Telephone Excise Tax Repeal and Taxpayer Protection and Assistance
Act of 2006, S. 132 1).
288. See id.
289. See infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
290. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
291. See Crystal Tandon, Economic Substance Codification Would Create More
Problems Than It Solves, Says Korb, 118 TAX NOTES 777, 777 (2008); see also Hill &
Minkovich, supra note 214, at 81 (predicting that the strict liability penalty will produce less
disclosure, not more, because the taxpayer does not benefit by disclosure or good-faith
attempt at complying with the Code).
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clarify the doctrine's application, based on evidence suggesting that
defending on the ESD requires greater IRS resources than defending on
other grounds. 292 There is even a question as to whether IRS agents will be
disinclined to assert penalties under the ESD because of the doctrine's
resource intensive nature. 293
Another unintended consequence predicted by opponents of the strict
liability standard is that courts may hesitate to use the doctrine to invalidate
a tax benefit or recharacterize a transaction because the penalties are higher
and cannot be abated.294 The strict liability penalty creates an anomaly by
imposing a high penalty for noneconomic substance transactions, whereas
the failure of the same transaction on other tax shelter doctrines would
impose no or smaller penalties. 295 This is especially salient because the
proposal does not define how the ESD will interact with other similar
doctrines such as the "sham transaction" doctrine. 296 Hence, the ABA
suggests that IRS should focus on pursuing cases on technical rules rather
than on the ESD.29 7
In conclusion, opponents of the strict liability standard argue that strict
liability should not be used in the context of the ESD because it contravenes
tax policies such as fairness to the taxpayer, is not proper as a revenue
raiser, is unsuitable for use with a fluid and complex doctrine such as the
ESD, and may produce unintended consequences. 298  Addressing the
proponents' deterrence argument, opponents argue that the new penalty
regime will not produce additional deterrence of tax shelters299 but that the
292. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 142, at 34 (statement of Samuel
C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, UCLA) (arguing that legislation adds to the complexity of
enforcing tax penalties because the statute is another issue to consider and resolve); Hearing
on the Tax Gap, supra note 220, at 103 (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration) (noting that time spent on examinations per tax return has
increased in 2004, and this is partially attributable to the types of cases being handled);
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 64-65 & nn.206-208 (giving examples
of resources needed for the IRS to win its cases, such as extensive expert testimony on
foreign currency options markets, or on whether transferring asbestos liability to a subsidiary
limits the transferor's liability); A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at
11 (asserting that economic substance cases are resource intensive for both the IRS and the
taxpayer).
293. Compare Jeremiah Coder, Korb Continues PR Battle Against Economic Substance
Codification, 117 TAX NOTES 578, 578 (2007) (arguing that IRS agents may avoid using the
ESD due to the extra administrative steps required to assert the penalty, such as obtaining
approval from the Chief Counsel or his delegate), and Nahass, supra note 214, at 267, with
A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 11 (suggesting that the high
strict liability penalty amount may make ESD attractive over other doctrines).
294. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 65; Hill & Minkovich, supra
note 214, at 80; Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1359.
295. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 68.
296. See Korb, supra note 183, at 395.
297. See A.B.A. Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 11-12 n.32
(collecting cases).
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 80 (referring to Assistant Treasury
Secretary Eric Solomon, who believes that codification of the ESD will not produce
additional deterrence because (1) the Treasury and IRS are already focused on fighting tax
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current tax laws sufficiently target the tax shelter problem, as evidenced by
IRS winning many tax shelter cases. 300 At the same time, the higher
penalty is believed to restrain legitimate transactions or tax planning
because of the risk that the penalty will be improperly imposed on these
legitimate activities, without the opportunity for abatement. 30 1 Ultimately,
opponents of strict liability see it as a deviation from the traditional
reasonable cause exception, the reasons for which are not sufficiently
justified. 302
III. REJECTING THE STRICT LIABILITY PENALTY STANDARD: RETAIN THE
CURRENT PENALTY REGIME OR DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
CONTAINING THE REASONABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION
Part II explored the reasons for and against adopting a strict liability
standard for penalizing noneconomic substance transactions. Part III.A
argues against the adoption of the strict liability standard. Part III.B
advocates that the current penalty regime containing the reasonable cause
exception should be retained, or, alternatively, new solutions should be
developed to address the tax shelter problem.
A. The Arguments Weigh Against Adopting the Strict Liability Penalty
Standard
Admittedly, tax shelters are against public policy, and the ESD and its
associated understatement penalty contribute to IRS's overall strategy in
eradicating tax shelters.303 The argument that harsh penalties are justified
in tax shelters is a compelling one. 304 Notwithstanding the validity of the
concern regarding tax shelters, the penalty regime can maintain its efficacy
without changing the penalty standard from reasonable cause to strict
liability. On balance of the arguments espoused by proponents and
opponents of strict liability, the arguments weigh against adopting the strict
liability standard.
The strongest argument for adopting the strict liability standard is
deterrence of tax shelters. 30 5  While the proponents of strict liability
criticize the current regime as failing to impose sufficient punitive
shelters and (2) courts may hesitate to use the ESD because of the harsh strict liability
penalty).
300. See Korb, supra note 183, at 395; Ventry, supra note 173, at 1408-10.
301. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 65; AICPA, supra note 230,
at 5-6 (expressing concern that transaction categories subject to penalty are too broad and
could inhibit legitimate transactions, especially in light of the strict liability penalty); Korb,
supra note 183, at 393; Jeremiah Coder, Administration Still Opposes Economic Substance
Codification, 115 TAX NOTES 813, 813 (2007); Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 81-82
(predicting that the penalty may have a "chilling effect" on risk averse taxpayers); A.B.A.
Tax Section on ESD Codification, supra note 230, at 8.
302. See Stretch et al., supra note 210, at 1361.
303. See generally supra Parts I.A.1, I.C.l.a, II.A.l.
304. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part II.A. 1.
2010] 2045
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
consequences relative to the potential benefit of noneconomic substance
transactions, they do not clearly establish how strict liability will produce
additional deterrence simply by making noneconomic substance
transactions more onerous.306 If the current understatement penalty of
twenty percent is insufficient to deter tax shelters, it does not necessarily
follow that a forty percent penalty will effectively deter tax shelters, even if
the taxpayer is precluded from asserting the reasonable cause defense, as
the taxpayer may still hedge his bets of winning on the claim that his
transaction has economic substance. 30 7 This premise is augmented when
considering the criticism that the codified ESD will remain an uncertain
doctrine that may be applied by courts in an inconsistent manner.308 As
critics of strict liability point out, the strict liability penalty may be
counterproductive to deterrence and instead drive taxpayers to resist
disclosure to, and cooperation with, IRS because such disclosure or
cooperation will not afford them any abatement of penalty. 30 9
The other arguments espoused by proponents of strict liability appear
unrelated to the merits of the strict liability standard. First, the argument
that strict liability penalties should be used to raise federal revenue appears
to bear little connection to the merits of adopting a new standard by which
to assess understatement penalties. Tax penalties as revenue raisers at best
involve mixed motives and at worst become arbitrary punishment of the
taxpayer, which is not within the role of tax penalties. 310 Notwithstanding
the need to close the tax gap, which owes its existence largely to
understatement of tax liability, 311 adopting a rule that unilaterally penalizes
the taxpayer without regard to his good-faith attempt to report the correct
tax liability can hardly be an ideal way to close the tax gap. Second, the
argument that tax professionals must be deterred from promoting tax
shelters appears misplaced because tax professionals should be, and are,
regulated under standards of professional responsibility rather than through
understatement tax penalties. 312  Penalizing the taxpayer for his tax
advisor's misconduct amounts to unwarranted punishment of the taxpayer,
who should be able to rely on the advice of his tax professional.
The strongest argument proffered by opponents of strict liability is the
unfairness brought upon the taxpayer. 313 In eliminating the taxpayer's
opportunity to justify his tax position before IRS or the court, at least two
important interests are at stake. First, it undermines voluntary compliance
by precluding the taxpayer from demonstrating his good-faith compliance
with the Code, thereby reducing his incentive to voluntarily comply with
306. See supra notes 212-26 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part II.B.3.
309. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part II.B.2.
311. See supra Part II.A.2.
312. See supra Part II.A.3.
313. See supra Part II.B.1.
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the Code.314 It is voluntary compliance, or the over eighty percent of taxes
being reported on a voluntary basis, that permits IRS to allocate its
resources to target truly culpable conduct. 315 Should voluntary compliance
be compromised, IRS would need to disperse its resources across a wider
range of noncompliance rather than focusing its efforts on its most pressing
needs. 316 This result is the opposite of what is needed to fight tax shelters,
as evidence suggests that using the ESD to litigate tax shelter cases requires
extensive resources. 317 One suggested remedy to the tax shelter problem
called for IRS to increase its resources in order to fully implement the
existing tools at IRS's disposal.318 Decreasing voluntary compliance could
ultimately debilitate IRS's efforts to combat tax shelters.
The second interest at stake in eliminating the reasonable cause exception
is the due process that is denied to the taxpayer. 319 A taxpayer with
genuine mitigating circumstances has no venue, either at the IRS level or at
the federal court level, upon which to challenge the validity of the penalty
assessed against him. 320 Such lack of due process does not advance any
interest claimed by proponents of the strict liability standard, despite their
efforts to characterize the reasonable cause exception as "wiggle room" to
slither out of a penalty. 321 Rather, the taxpayer's inability to appeal the
penalty is highly problematic, especially considering that the ESD is a fluid
and uncertain doctrine that is unsuitable for statutory definition. 322 Not
only is the split among the circuit courts unsettled, the codified ESD does
not achieve a satisfactory resolution because it does not reconcile itself to
existing case law and leaves many critical elements of the doctrine
undefined.323 A vague doctrine cannot serve as the basis for a bright-line
strict liability penalty, but that is the curious result that would be reached by
the codification proposal.324 This context increases the need to permit the
taxpayer to raise the reasonable cause exception, which may serve as a
backstop in the event that inconsistent holdings result from the confusing
legislation.
Balancing the arguments on either side of the debate surrounding the
strict liability penalty, strict liability should not be adopted. On the one
314. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
315. The National Taxpayer Advocate's 2008 Annual Report to Congress reports that
eighty-four percent of taxes are reported and paid voluntarily, but unfair tax penalty
administration could undermine voluntary compliance. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV.,
supra note 222, at 4.
316. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233 (recommending
that IRS focus its efforts in administering tax penalties to drive voluntary compliance).
317. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 243.
319. See supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
322. See Bernard Wolfman, Why Economic Substance Is Better Left Uncodified, 104 TAX
NOTES 445, 445 (2004) (positing that the ESD would lose its usefulness if reduced to a
"formulaic legislative Rx").
323. See supra notes 275, 277-85 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.B.3.
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hand, the strict liability standard is not demonstrably connected to superior
deterrence of tax shelters, while on the other hand it carries the risk of
producing profound unfairness to the taxpayer.325  Furthermore, strict
liability carries potential unintended consequences, which may span beyond
increased litigation between IRS and the taxpayer or lead to disuse of the
ESD itself.326  Without a full understanding of the consequences of
adopting the strict liability standard, it would be premature at best to enact
it under the ESD codification proposal. A comprehensive assessment of
workable alternatives must be considered before the strict liability penalty
standard can be justifiably adopted, if at all.
B. The Reasonable Cause Exception Should Remain a Feature of the
Penalty Regime
Having resolved that the strict liability standard should not be adopted,
this section suggests two possible alternatives. One is to retain the current
penalty regime, which can be viewed as sufficiently addressing the tax
shelter problem. 327  The other is to develop an alternative solution
altogether that does not rely on a pure strict liability standard. In either of
these two scenarios, the reasonable cause exception should be a feature of
the penalty regime to avoid the pitfalls of the strict liability standard.
Should the current penalty regime be retained, understatement penalties
will continue to be assessed for noneconomic substance transactions, but
the reasonable cause exception will remain available. 328 This preserves the
taxpayer's interests in asserting the reasonable cause defense while also
preserving IRS's interest, as courts can declare that reasonable cause is
lacking in a given case and uphold the penalty.329 While proponents of
strict liability may characterize the status quo as failing to increase the
stakes in the tax shelter battle, the counterargument is that the current
penalty regime appears to be working, as IRS continues to win its cases in
the courts under existing laws. 330 Thus, the current penalty regime does not
appear to be in urgent need of a deviation to the strict liability standard.
Moreover, the argument can be made that the current penalty regime should
be preferred over the codified version because one of the merits of the ESD
is its flexibility to identify and invalidate varying forms of tax shelter
transactions, which cannot be as aptly accomplished with one statutory
definition of economic substance. 331
Should an alternative solution be developed, it must avoid the pitfalls of a
pure strict liability standard. One alternative that deserves support is the
approach suggested by Lawrence Hill and Alexandra Minkovich, which
325. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
326. See supra Part II.B.4.
327. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part I.B.
329. See supra Part I.B.
330. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
331. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(D)(7) & n.1283.
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provides for two levels of penalties, with the level of penalty turning on
disclosure.332 If the taxpayer adequately discloses the transaction at issue,
the penalty would be twenty percent, and the taxpayer would have the
opportunity to assert the reasonable cause exception. 333 Judicial review
would be available for the penalty that was assessed.334 If the taxpayer
does not adequately disclose the transaction, then a higher forty percent
penalty would apply on a strict liability basis, but the IRS Commissioner
would have discretion to rescind the penalty according to published
criteria.335 The Commissioner's refusal to rescind the penalty would be
reviewable by a court for abuse of discretion.336 As Hill and Minkovich
point out, this approach reaches a compromise by effectuating more serious
consequences for noneconomic substance transactions while retaining the
reasonable cause exception, hence avoiding at least some of the problems
with due process or voluntary disclosure. 337 This approach, or others like
it, would comport with the views of those who advocate a higher penalty to
deter tax shelters but still oppose codification for its shortcomings. 338
Whatever the solution, it cannot come at the expense of fairness to the
taxpayer, and IRS may need to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its
penalty administration before a suitable solution can be developed. 339
CONCLUSION
It is undoubtedly important to curb abusive tax shelters and noneconomic
substance transactions. In pursuing this goal, the competing interests of
deterrence on one side and fairness to the taxpayer on the other must be
carefully balanced. The proposed strict liability standard for penalizing
noneconomic substance transactions represents a significant change from
the reasonable cause exception used in existing tax law. Notwithstanding
the merits of the arguments on each side of the debate, arguments weigh
332. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 214, at 82.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See, e.g., Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 30, at 40, 46-47 (statement
of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff, J. Comm. on Taxation); Jackel, supra note 50, at 76;
VanderWolk, supra note 64, at 547; Ventry, supra note 173, at 1411; Wolfman, supra note
322, at 445. In analyzing individual income tax understatement penalties, Professor William
A. Drennan advocates an alternative solution that features varying levels of penalty based on
the taxpayer's level of disclosure. He first argues that tax avoidance cannot adequately be
addressed by either a fault-based system that permits exceptions or a purely strict liability
system that undermines compliance. Rather, he suggests an alternative solution in which a
taxpayer making full and conspicuous disclosure is excused from the penalty or assessed
graduated penalty rates for small mistakes. See Drennan, supra note 223.
339. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, in its 2008 report to the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, pointed out that IRS is not meeting its expectation of conducting
continuous and comprehensive assessment of its penalty administration to ensure effective
and fair penalties that encourage voluntary compliance. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 233, at 18.
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against adopting the strict liability standard. The current penalty regime
should be retained or alternative solutions developed. At the very least, it is
necessary to conduct a comprehensive and critical assessment of the
implications of any change to the tax penalty regime before such change
can be justifiably enacted under a plan to codify the ESD. By adopting the
approach suggested in this Note, tax penalties can help drive correct
taxpayer behavior without compromising the interests essential to an
effective and fair tax penalty system.
